MerekaKYCResearch preview

How it knows

How it knows a document is real. And what it cannot know yet.

Mereka KYC verifies people for any organisation that has to know who it is dealing with: marketplaces, programmes, NGOs, employers. Here is exactly how it judges a passport and a MyKad, which attacks each piece of evidence answers, how a decision is reached without a person in the loop, and what runs today.

Passport

Its NFC chip, read in the Mereka app, which is not available yet. A web browser cannot read it.

Web NFC, in Chrome on Android only, reads simple NDEF tags; it cannot open an e-passport chip (ISO-DEP with BAC or PACE), and iOS has no Web NFC at all. So chip reading needs the Mereka app, and until it ships a passport is checked from photos only, as optical evidence. Once read, the chip's data is signed by the issuing state, and the signature chains to that state's own certificate authority (ICAO 9303). It is the one layer whose answer is mathematical rather than statistical, and the chip can prove it is not a copy.

Strongest layer: Passive authenticationIn development

MyKad

Phones have no route to the MyKad chip today.

The chip answers only to readers and software authorised by JPN, and we hold no such authorisation, so a phone has no route to it. (A new MyKad generation is reported to carry a dual-interface chip; JPN has not confirmed it, and reading any generation would still need JPN's authorisation.) On a phone, MyKad authenticity comes from layered evidence: the number, the print, the face, liveness and the capture path. The authoritative route is MyDigital ID.

Strongest layer: MyDigital IDPlanned

Research mode4 of 15 evidence layers run on staging today.0 of 9 pinned model files are qualified.No decision carries an identity assurance yet.

§01The evidence stack

Every verdict is a stack of evidence. Here is each layer.

What each layer establishes, how strong that evidence is, which attacks it answers, and whether it runs today. Status is read from the work tracker and the staging configuration, not written by hand.

Its NFC chip, read in the Mereka app, which is not available yet. A web browser cannot read it. Web NFC, in Chrome on Android only, reads simple NDEF tags; it cannot open an e-passport chip (ISO-DEP with BAC or PACE), and iOS has no Web NFC at all. So chip reading needs the Mereka app, and until it ships a passport is checked from photos only, as optical evidence. Once read, the chip's data is signed by the issuing state, and the signature chains to that state's own certificate authority (ICAO 9303). It is the one layer whose answer is mathematical rather than statistical, and the chip can prove it is not a copy.

Defended by a live layer today2 of 6 threats
  • Forgery MRZ check digits and field consistency
  • Tamper MRZ check digits and field consistency
  • Recapture Nothing live yetIn development: Liveness and presentation-attack detection
  • Injection Nothing live yetPlanned: Capture-injection defence
  • Cloned chip Nothing live yetIn development: Chip or active authentication
  • Impostor Nothing live yetIn development: Face match against the chip portrait
Passport: each evidence layer, strongest first, its status today and how it defends against each threat.
Layer · strongest firstToday
In developmentprimary defenceprimary defenceno defenceno defenceno defenceno defence
In developmentno defenceno defenceno defenceno defenceprimary defenceno defence
In developmentno defenceno defenceno defenceno defenceno defenceprimary defence
In developmentno defenceno defenceprimary defenceno defenceno defencepartial defence
Plannedno defenceno defencepartial defenceprimary defenceno defenceno defence
Plannedpartial defencepartial defencepartial defenceno defenceno defenceno defence
Live, research modepartial defencepartial defenceno defenceno defenceno defenceno defence
Plannedno defenceno defenceno defenceno defenceno defenceno defence
Live, research modeno defenceno defenceno defenceno defenceno defenceno defence
Live, research modeno defenceno defenceno defenceno defenceno defenceno defence
  • thickness is strength · brass rim: cryptographic or authoritative
  • live · in development · planned
  • primary · partial · none

Passive authentication

Cryptographic · in the service · ICAO 9303 Part 11 and Part 12

In development

How it works

The chip's Document Security Object (SOD) holds a hash of every data group, signed with the issuing state's Document Signer certificate, which is itself signed by that state's Country Signing CA (CSCA). The engine re-hashes DG1 and DG2, verifies the signature and walks the chain to a CSCA trust anchor from the ICAO PKD or a national master list.

Its work item is in progress or landed, but it does not run on staging yet.

Defends against

  • Forgery · primary
  • Tamper · primary

What it cannot do

A byte-for-byte copy of a genuine chip carries the same valid signature, so passive authentication alone cannot see a clone.

Work items

  • kyc-frk8in progress
  • kyc-97w.1open
  1. Passive authentication

    In development

    Cryptographic · in the service

    The chip's data is exactly what the issuing state signed.

    • Forgeryprimary
    • Tamperprimary
    How it works, and what it cannot do

    The chip's Document Security Object (SOD) holds a hash of every data group, signed with the issuing state's Document Signer certificate, which is itself signed by that state's Country Signing CA (CSCA). The engine re-hashes DG1 and DG2, verifies the signature and walks the chain to a CSCA trust anchor from the ICAO PKD or a national master list.

    Cannot: A byte-for-byte copy of a genuine chip carries the same valid signature, so passive authentication alone cannot see a clone.

    • kyc-frk8in progress
    • kyc-97w.1open
  2. Chip or active authentication

    In development

    Cryptographic · in the Mereka app, not available yet

    The chip proves it holds a private key that cannot be copied.

    • Cloned chipprimary
    How it works, and what it cannot do

    The chip holds a private key that never leaves it, and the matching public key sits in its signed data. The Mereka app sends a fresh challenge; the chip answers with a signature (Active Authentication) or agrees session keys (Chip Authentication) that only that key can produce. A copied chip cannot copy the key, so it fails.

    Cannot: Not every issuing state enables either protocol. Where a chip offers neither, a clone cannot be ruled out cryptographically, and the case says so. A web page cannot send the challenge: it needs the Mereka app.

    • kyc-frk8in progress
    • kyc-97w.1open
  3. Face match against the chip portrait

    In development

    Strong · in the service

    The person holding the phone is the person the state photographed.

    • Impostorprimary
    How it works, and what it cannot do

    A live selfie is compared one-to-one with DG2, the portrait the issuing state signed into the chip. Because the reference comes from the signed chip, swapping the photo on the printed page does not help an impostor.

    Cannot: A face score says nothing about whether the selfie is live or injected; the next two layers answer that.

    • kyc-uzt.5open
    • kyc-4w6closed
  4. Liveness and presentation-attack detection

    In development

    Strong · in the service

    The face in front of the camera is a live person, not a photo, a screen or a mask.

    • Recaptureprimary
    • Impostorpartial
    How it works, and what it cannot do

    Passive and active cues decide whether the camera sees a live face or a presentation attack: a printed photo, a screen replay, a mask. Error rates are measured per attack type as APCER (attacks accepted) and BPCER (genuine people refused).

    Cannot: It judges what the camera saw. It cannot tell that the camera itself was bypassed.

    • kyc-uzt.7open
    • kyc-4w6closed
  5. Capture-injection defence

    Planned

    Strong · on the phone

    The media came through the capture page's own camera path, not a virtual one.

    • Recapturepartial
    • Injectionprimary
    How it works, and what it cannot do

    Each capture is bound to the device session and its timing; virtual cameras, emulators and replayed streams are detected, and media that did not come through the capture page's own camera path is refused. Not built yet: today the hosted page also accepts a chosen file, and every upload is recorded as a customer upload with no device attestation.

    Cannot: Device signals can be spoofed by a determined attacker. This raises the cost of injection; it does not make it impossible.

    • kyc-uzt.8open
  6. Optical document checks

    Planned

    Supporting · in the service

    The printed page looks like the genuine document, and agrees with its chip.

    • Forgerypartial
    • Tamperpartial
    • Recapturepartial
    How it works, and what it cannot do

    Security features under the camera (optically variable elements, guilloche and print pattern), the printed visual zone against the chip's data, and recapture cues such as moiré, screen pixels and glare.

    Cannot: Image forensics catch careless alteration; a high-quality counterfeit can pass them, which is why the chip outranks them.

    • kyc-uzt.6open
  7. MRZ check digits and field consistency

    Live, research mode

    Supporting · in the service

    The machine-readable zone is internally consistent and matches the printed page.

    • Forgerypartial
    • Tamperpartial
    How it works, and what it cannot do

    The two 44-character lines at the foot of the data page carry check digits over the document number, the date of birth, the expiry date and a composite over all of them. Each is recomputed, and the MRZ is compared field by field with the printed visual zone.

    Cannot: Check digits are public arithmetic: a careful forger computes them too.

    On staging: the engine runs check.passport-mrz-consistency for customer cases, in research mode.

    • kyc-smmclosed
  8. NFC chip read

    Planned

    Foundation · in the Mereka app, not available yet

    The Mereka app opens the chip and reads what the state wrote into it.

    Defends nothing on its own: a foundation for the layers above.

    How it works, and what it cannot do

    In the Mereka app (not available yet), the phone derives an access key from the MRZ (document number, date of birth, expiry date), opens a secure channel with BAC or PACE, and reads DG1 (the MRZ data), DG2 (the portrait as issued) and the Document Security Object.

    Cannot: A web page cannot do this: Web NFC reads NDEF tags only, not an e-passport's ISO-DEP chip, and iOS has no Web NFC. And reading the chip proves nothing until its signature and key are checked by the two layers at the top of this stack.

    • kyc-97w.1open
  9. Printed-field read

    Live, research mode

    Foundation · in the service

    A pinned OCR model reads the printed fields so other layers can compare them.

    Defends nothing on its own: a foundation for the layers above.

    How it works, and what it cannot do

    A pinned optical character recognition model reads the printed fields from the document front. On staging it runs as the engine action model.ocr-small, on the service's own CPU, in research mode.

    Cannot: Reading a field is not checking it: a well-printed fake reads perfectly.

    On staging: the engine runs model.ocr-small for customer cases, in research mode.

    • kyc-uzt.3in progress
    • kyc-1us.4open
  10. Private capture and intake

    Live, research mode

    Foundation · in the service

    Every image is bound to its exact bytes before anything reads it.

    Defends nothing on its own: a foundation for the layers above.

    How it works, and what it cannot do

    Images travel from the phone to a private compartment under a short-lived, single-case capability. The service reserves a slot, checks the declared length, hashes the exact bytes, sniffs the real file type and keeps only exact, metadata-stripped derivatives. Every later reading points back to those bytes.

    Cannot: It judges nothing about authenticity: a perfect forgery uploads as cleanly as a genuine document.

    On staging: 3 customer verification profiles across 2 applications accept uploads through this intake.

    • kyc-tqw.5open

§02Passport

What the chip proves. And why a copy fails.

An e-passport carries a contactless chip, signed by the issuing state. Reading it needs the Mereka app, which is not available yet: a web browser cannot open a passport chip. Once read, checking the state's signature is arithmetic, not judgement.

  1. 01MRZDocument number, date of birth and expiry, read from the page.
  2. 02Access keyDerived from the MRZ; opens a secure channel with BAC or PACE.
  3. 03Chip dataDG1, the MRZ as issued. DG2, the signed portrait. The SOD.
  4. 04HashesEach data group re-hashed and compared with the SOD's list.
  5. 05Document SignerIts signature over the SOD is verified.
  6. 06CSCAThe issuing state's own root, which signed the Document Signer.
  7. 07Trust anchorThe CSCA, matched against the ICAO PKD or a national master list.

Is it a copy?

A fresh challenge goes to the chip. Only the private key inside it can sign the answer (Active Authentication) or agree the session keys (Chip Authentication). A cloned chip has the data but not the key, so it fails here, after passing every step above.

In development

Is it you?

DG2, the portrait the state signed into the chip, is compared one-to-one with a live selfie. A photo swapped on the printed page never enters this comparison.

In development
Steps 04 to 07 are passive authentication (ICAO 9303 Part 11 and Part 12): if one byte of DG1 or DG2 changed, or the signature does not chain to the issuing state, the chip’s evidence is refused.In development

§03MyKad

No phone route to the chip. So the evidence is layered.

The MyKad chip is a contact chip that answers only to readers and software authorised by JPN. On a phone, authenticity is built from independent layers, each catching a different attack, and the authoritative route is MyDigital ID.

On a phone

Layered evidence: the number, the print, the face, liveness and the capture path. Each layer is supporting or strong; none is proof alone.

  • Face comparison with the card portraitIn development
  • Liveness and presentation-attack detectionIn development
  • Capture-injection defencePlanned
  • Visual and print forensicsPlanned
  • IC-number consistencyLive, research mode

At a counter

A JPN-authorised reader reads the chip itself. Authoritative, but only where such a reader is installed and authorised.

  • Chip read on a JPN-authorised readerPlanned

With MyDigital ID

The person signs in with the national digital identity and the issuer asserts it. No card image to forge, alter or inject.

  • MyDigital IDPlanned

The number checks itself against the card

YYMMDD–PB–###G
  1. YYMMDDDate of birthBy common convention, not published by JPN: compared with the printed date, never read from.
  2. PBPlace of birthAgainst JPN's published state and country code tables (01 to 16 and 21 to 59 for states and territories; country codes above).
  3. ###SerialAssigned by JPN. Nothing to cross-check.
  4. GLast digitBy common convention odd for male, even for female; unconfirmed by JPN, so a mismatch is a question, never a verdict.
The convention is public and JPN has not published it, so this layer is supporting evidence: it catches a careless forgery, a forger who knows the convention passes it, and nothing about the person is ever derived from the number.Live, research mode

§04How decisions are made

The engine decides on its own. People see only what it cannot settle.

Decisions are autonomous by design. A case escalates only when it is flagged, first to an AI investigator, and to a person only if the investigator cannot resolve it.

  1. Every submitted case
    01

    The engine decides

    Pinned models, deterministic checks, the Bend2 policy kernel

    Methods produce typed observations; the compiled policy graph runs on the Bend2 kernel and commits a decision only when a published release qualifies each claim in that exact scope. By design, most cases end here, with no person involved.

    Decides: approved, declined, or more evidence needed.

    Live, research modeOn staging: the engine worker claims submitted cases and records decisions in research mode.
    • kyc-n1bclosed
    • kyc-tqw.4closed
  2. Only flagged cases
    02

    Flagged cases go to an AI investigator

    A bounded investigator with an allowlist

    Only a flagged case goes on: contradictory evidence, a weak reading, a claim no method settled. The investigator may request more evidence or run allowlisted methods. It can never approve, reject or change a threshold.

    Resolves the flag with new evidence, or hands on everything it tried.

    In developmentIts work item is in progress or landed, but it does not run on staging yet.
    • kyc-ynm.1closed
    • kyc-ynm.2open
    • kyc-ynm.3open
    • kyc-ynm.4open
    • kyc-1us.6open
  3. Only if still unresolved
    03

    Still unresolved: a person

    A reviewer, with the whole evidence chain

    What the investigator could not settle lands in the reviewer queue with every observation, every check and what was tried. The reviewer's recommendation is recorded under their own name, like any other evidence.

    Records a recommendation under the reviewer's own name.

    Live, research modeOn staging: the reviewer queue and staff console read the service.
    • kyc-tqw.3closed

§05Honest status

Research mode today. Measurement turns autonomy on.

Every method is unqualified, so every staging decision is recorded in research mode with no assurance attached. Evidence from an unqualified method can inform a case; it can never carry an assurance. Three things change that, per method and per claim.

  1. 01

    Sealed, labelled data

    Labelled independently, sealed before any method sees it

    A qualification set whose labels come from people who did not build the method, sealed so that no method can be tuned on its own exam.

    Planned
    • kyc-uzt.10open
  2. 02

    Measured error rates at the operating point

    At the exact threshold the policy uses

    False accepts and false rejects measured at the threshold the policy will run, and for presentation attacks APCER and BPCER per attack type (ISO/IEC 30107-3). A score without its operating point is not a measurement.

    Planned
    • kyc-uzt.5open
    • kyc-uzt.7open
    • kyc-1us.2open
  3. 03

    A published release that qualifies the claim

    Per method, per claim, per scope

    A release names the method, the claim, the scope and the measured result. The kernel commits an assured decision only when such a release covers the claim in that exact scope; withdraw the release and decisions stop carrying assurance.

    In development
    • kyc-tqw.4closed
Evidence layers live on staging
4 of 15
MRZ check digits and field consistency · Printed-field read · Private capture and intake · IC-number consistency
Pinned model files qualified
0 of 9
development execution only
Decisions carrying assurance
0 research mode
every result says so

Statuses read from the work tracker (Beads) and deploy/coolify/staging/config as of f96976ae · 2026-11-11. Live means configured to run on staging, in research mode; in development means its work item is in progress or landed; planned means specified and not started.

§06The machine

Most checks return a badge. This one returns its reasons.

Every outcome names the exact evidence, method releases and policy kernel behind it, so a reviewer, a customer or an auditor can follow it back.

  1. 01RequestA customer organisation (a marketplace, a programme, an NGO, an employer) opens a case for a person, under a stated purpose and recipient.
  2. 02CaptureThe person follows a single-use link and uploads to a private intake that inspects each image and keeps only exact derivatives.
  3. 03ReadPinned methods read the evidence on the service's own CPU. A method that cannot run is declared unavailable. There is no silent fallback.
  4. 04DecideA compiled policy graph runs on the Bend2 kernel. A decision commits only if a published, unwithdrawn release qualifies each claim in that exact scope.
  5. 05NotifyThe customer gets a minimised, recipient-bound view and a signed change notice. What policy cannot settle goes to an investigator, then a person.

Evidence coordinates

Every reading is bound to a region, a source, a time and a method. Change one region and only the conclusions that depended on it are invalidated. Nothing else is recomputed, and nothing is taken on trust.

  • Captures, observations and decisions are separate, typed records.
  • A small controller may propose the next action from an allowlist. It can never approve or reject.
  • A strong face result cannot cancel contradictory document evidence.
portraitvisual zoneissuerMRZ · 2×44

The engine · small, strict parts with one writer

  • Common contractsclosedStrict wire, calendar and hash contracts shared by Rust, TypeScript and Python; purpose, evidence, method and decision are different types; operation receipts and exact current results.
  • Durable case storein useCases live in a FrankenGraphDB realm compartment on asupersync: one writer, atomic commits, encrypted side store for bodies, pinned read views, hash-chained release events.
  • Release registryin useImmutable, hash-chained workflow releases pinned to one policy-kernel digest. A decision is committed only if a published, unwithdrawn release qualifies each claim in exactly that scope.
  • Policy kernelin progressAn executable pure Bend2 kernel decides from the compiled obligation graph; allowed actions are scoped computations, not durable reservations or permission to send effects.
  • Engine workerdevelopmentClaims a submitted case under a durable fenced lease, runs registered methods in research mode, journals every request, and posts observations and a gated decision exactly once.
  • Specialist modelsdevelopmentFour pinned local models execute through the same catalogue on CPU; none is qualified. Thai, Lao, Khmer and Myanmar literal output is refused, not guessed.
  • Synthetic development corpusdevelopment252 fictional images in 28 groups with exact region boxes, a sealed held-out split and OCR calibration receipts. No genuine documents.
  • Load and soak harnesspartialA real mk-service driven with valid JWTs, engine writes, an outbox receiver and an adversarial mix. The 24 h soak and fault injection are not done.

Policy kernelmereka.graph-native-release/1sha-256 1e970ab4e6eeeb0f…Bend2 · pinned by digest · withdrawable

§07Malaysia first, Southeast Asia next

Eleven countries researched. None live.

Malaysia is the home market and has the deepest source dossier: JPN, the MyKad families, passports and MyDigital ID. The other ten have source-attributed drafts. Coverage here means research on public primary sources, not a supported verification route.

  • MYMalaysiaDossier completeWave 1 (home market)
  • SGSingaporeDraftWave 1
  • THThailandDraftWave 1
  • IDIndonesiaDraftWave 2
  • PHPhilippinesDraftWave 2
  • VNVietnamDraftWave 2
  • KHCambodiaDraftPlanned
  • LALaosDraftPlanned
  • MMMyanmarDraftPlanned
  • BNBruneiDraftPlanned
  • TLTimor-LesteDraftPlanned

Live source access (JPN, ICA, Singpass, ThaiD, NDID and others) is not established for any country.

§08Privacy by design

Collect less. Bind it to a purpose. Say what is not done.

  1. Art. 1

    Purpose and recipient on everything

    Each case, grant and result names its purpose and recipient. Results expire, and a late notice cannot restore an approval.

  2. Art. 2

    Private by construction

    Images go to a private compartment; bodies sit in an encrypted side store; derivatives are exact and metadata-stripped. Support sees identifiers and task state, not image galleries.

  3. Art. 3

    No hidden gallery, no silent training

    There is no cross-customer face database, and customer captures are not used to train models.

  4. Art. 4

    Sensitive attributes are not claims

    A MyKad chip holds race and religion. The engine does not extract or infer them unless a lawful claim requires it.

  5. Art. 5

    No silent fallback

    No model or processing region is ever swapped in quietly. A method that cannot run returns a declared “unavailable”, not a guess.

  6. Art. 6

    Kept as the organisation's record

    A verification is the requesting organisation's record, kept under its legal and anti-money-laundering obligations and never deleted on a timer. People can ask that organisation about access and correction.

§09Proof, not promises

What exists today, and what does not.

Dated receipts101each with a SHA-256 and a commit
Pinned model files14development use; qualification pending
Work items closed425of 588 tracked
Countries researched11live support: 0

Not established

  • No model is qualified for real identity decisions; every method runs in research mode.
  • Real verifications run only on staging, with the person's consent; every result is research-mode and carries no assurance.
  • Latency figures come from a heavily contended shared host and are not capacity numbers.
  • Live source access (JPN, ICA, Singpass, ThaiD, NDID and others) is not established for any country.